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Abstract. The functional theory of boredom maintains that boredom ought to be defined in terms of 
its role in our mental and behavioral economy. Although the functional theory has recently received 
considerable attention, presentations of this theory have not specified with sufficient precision either 
its commitments or its consequences for the ontology of boredom. This essay offers an in-depth 
examination of the functional theory. It explains what boredom is according to the functional view; it 
shows how the functional theory can account for the known characteristics of boredom; and it 
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understanding of the functional theory of boredom, the essay contributes to a better theoretical 
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Boredom and Cognitive Engagement:  
A Functional Theory of Boredom 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There is no shortage of theories of boredom. If anything, there is an embarrassment of riches. 
In the literature one finds at least five distinct theoretical articulations of the nature of 
boredom. First, there is the psychodynamic theory of boredom which understands boredom 
to be the result of an unfulfilled desire1 (Fenichel, 1953; Greenson, 1953; Lewinsky, 1943). 
Second, there is the existential theory of boredom that maintains that boredom is a state of 
perceived meaninglessness, a response to the perception of meaninglessness, or both (Frankl, 
1984; Maddi, 1970; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011, 2012). Third, the arousal theory considers 
boredom to be a state of non-optimal arousal (Berlyne, 1960; Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; De 
Chenne, 1988; Hebb, 1966; O’Hanlon, 1981; Zuckerman, 1979). Fourth, the cognitive theory 
of boredom understands boredom to be the result of one’s difficulty or inability to cognitively 
engage with an object. The most influential variety of the cognitive theory maintains that 
boredom is inextricably bound to attentional difficulties or to the misallocation of attention 
(Eastwood et al., 2012; Fisher, 1993; Hamilton,1981; Harris, 2000; Hill and Perkins, 1985; Tam 
et al., 2021). Other varieties of this view implicate non-optimal subjective control or non-
optimal effort as reasons for lack of cognitive engagement (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; cf. Pekrun 
et al., 2010). Lastly, there is the functional account that conceives of boredom as a functional 
state—i.e., a state which is defined in terms of its role in the mental economy of the 
experiencing agent (Bench and Lench, 2013; Danckert, 2019; Danckert, Mugon, et al., 2018; 
Elpidorou, 2014, 2016, 2018a, 2018b; Kurzban et al., 2013; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012). In 
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addition, to these five characterizations there are also mixed views of boredom: i.e., views that 
combine into a single theory both cognitive and existential characterizations of boredom. For 
example, the MAC Model of Boredom holds that boredom arises either because one cannot 
find meaning in one’s activities or because one is not able to pay attention to one’s situation 
(Westgate & Wilson, 2018), whereas the Control-Value Theory of achievement emotions 
conceives of boredom as an emotional state that arises when there is perceived lack of value 
and non-optimal control (Pekrun et al., 2010). It is not entirely clear whether such views 
occupy distinct theoretical positions or whether they should be subsumed under one of the 
five aforementioned theories of boredom.2 Regardless of how one settles that issue, it is 
evident that the boredom literature contains different answers to the question what is boredom?  
Although theories of boredom often draw from the same pool of experimental 
findings, they offer diverging descriptions of the phenomenon at hand. Ultimately, they 
disagree as to what boredom is most fundamentally. Is it at heart a volitional, physiological, 
affective, or cognitive phenomenon? Or is it something else entirely? But even when two 
theories agree about the type of phenomenon that boredom is, they may still disagree regarding 
its specific nature. For instance, both the existential theory and the (attentional) cognitive 
theory of boredom understand boredom to be primarily a cognitive phenomenon, even 
though they explicate it in different ways: one emphasizes perceived meaninglessness in the 
experience of boredom, whereas the other underlines the role of attentional difficulties. Lastly, 
theoretical descriptions of boredom do not always make explicit whether what they isolate as 
the core of boredom (attentional difficulties, non-optimal arousal, perceived meaninglessness, 
etc.) is an antecedent of boredom, a proper part of boredom, or both. Despite our 
experimental and theoretical riches, it is clear that important questions about boredom remain 
unanswered. 
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 The current essay aims to present and assess one of the available theories of boredom: 
the functional theory. Although this theory has recently received considerable attention both 
within psychology and philosophy, presentations of the theory have not specified with 
sufficient precision either its commitments or its consequences for the ontology of boredom. 
This is primarily because extant presentations of this theory have had different aims: some of 
them were exploratory, investigating the possibility that boredom is a functional emotion 
(Bench & Lench, 2013; Elpidorou, 2014, 2016; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012); others explored 
the consequences of a functional account for behavior and self-regulation (Van Tilburg & 
Igou 2011, 2017a; Elpidorou 2018a, 2018b, 2020; Danckert, Mugon, et al., 2018); and others 
used the functional account as a way of exploring novel approaches to boredom and its 
relationship to goal pursuit (Bench & Lench, 2013), effort (Kurzban et al., 2013), or arousal 
(Elpidorou 2021). Given the growing interest in the functional view of boredom, the time is 
right to take a closer view at the basic premises of the functional theory. This essay offers an 
in-depth examination of the functional theory. It explains in what sense it is a theory of 
boredom and what boredom is according to this theory; it shows how the functional theory 
can account for the known characteristics of boredom; and it articulates its basic theoretical 
commitments, benefits, and limitations. It also defends a specific variety of the functional view 
according to which boredom signals the presence of unsatisfactory cognitive engagement and 
aims to restore satisfactory cognitive engagement. By seeking to further our understanding of 
the functional theory of boredom, the essay aims to contribute to a better theoretical 





2. THE CHARACTER OF BOREDOM 
Most of us have little trouble both recognizing boredom and distinguishing it from other 
related emotions and affective states (Goldberg et al., 2011; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012). As a 
transient psychological state, boredom is a common (Chin et al., 2017; Goetz et al., 2014; 
Smith & Page, 2015; The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse, 2003) aversive 
experience that signifies a failure to engage with one’s environment in a desired manner despite 
one’s motivation to do so (Danckert & Merrifield, 2016; Eastwood et al., 2012; Goldberg et 
al., 2011). Boredom is characterized by attentional difficulties, a perceived dissatisfaction with 
our current situation, and a felt desire to change our situation. It typically arises in situations 
that are perceived to be monotonous or lacking in novelty or meaning (Thackray et al. 1977; 
O’Brien, 2014; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012), that fail to engage sufficiently or optimally our 
cognitive resources (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975), or that are low in perceived autonomy (Hooft & 
Hooff, 2018; cf. Fenichel 1953; Fisher, 1993). 
 
2.1. Valence and Phenomenology 
Boredom appears to be unambiguously a psychological state of negative valence. It is 
phenomenologically an unpleasant experience (Harris, 2000; Hartocollis, 1972; Mikulas & 
Vodanovich, 1993; Pekrun et al., 2010; Todman, 2003; Vogel-Walcutt et al., 2012); it motivates 
withdrawal behaviour and involves a desire to escape from it (Berlyne, 1960; Fahlman et al., 
2013; Fenichel, 1953; Fiske and Maddi, 1961; Greenson, 1953; Mikulas and Vodanovich, 1993; 
Pekrun et al., 2010; Todman, 2003; Van Tilburg and Igou, 2012); it is triggered by situations 
that are perceived as negatively valued (uninteresting, trite, meaningless, etc.) (Van Tilburg & 
Igou, 2012, 2017a); it leads to a negative appraisal of one’s situation (Eastwood et al., 2012); 
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and its presence is judged by subjects to be incongruent to their wishes and valued goals (Van 
Tilburg & Igou, 2012).  
 Even though boredom’s valence appears to be negative in all of the aforesaid senses, 
its valence has been chiefly understood in terms of its phenomenology. Yet discussions of the 
phenomenology of boredom often underappreciate the complexity of the experience of 
boredom. Boredom is indeed an unpleasurable experience, but its aversive character is neither 
uniform nor constant across situations and time. First, first-personal reports on the character 
of the experience of boredom reveal that boredom is often experienced as both an apathetic 
and agitated state (Goetz et al., 2014; Harris, 2000; Martin et al., 2006; Steinberger et al., 2016). 
Second, the subjective experience of boredom may differ depending on various endogenous 
or exogenous factors. (Van Hooft & van Hooff, 2018; Westgate, 2020; Westgate & Wilson, 
2018). Third, boredom is an experience that unfolds in time and because of that, it may 
oscillate from a state of high arousal to one of low arousal, or vice versa (Eastwood et al., 
2012; cf. Danckert, Mugon, et al., 2018; Elpidorou, 2018b, 2021). It has been suggested that 
boredom may often begin as a state of low arousal because initially subjects find themselves 
unable to engage with their situation (Mills & Christoff, 2018). However, bored subjects will 
typically make efforts to engage with their environment and such attempts for engagement 
can result in an increase in arousal, especially if they are unsuccessful.  
Boredom is, thus, a phenomenologically rich state. But, of course, it is more than that, 
for it is not merely a sensation. Just like most emotions, boredom is a complex (i.e., 
multidimensional) construct (Sander et al., 2018). In addition to its phenomenological 
dimension, it has a cognitive dimension which consists of the associated thoughts, appraisals, 
and attentional mechanisms, along with its effects on our cognitive and perceptual processes. 
It also includes a volitional or motivational content that comprises of its associated desires and 
	 6	
action-tendencies. Lastly, it has an expressive component that includes its behavioral and 
physiological correlates. An adequate specification of the character of boredom requires a 
discussion of these additional dimensions of boredom.  
 
2.2. Cognitive Profile 
The cognitive profile of boredom is characterized chiefly by two features: the presence of 
negative appraisals of one’s situation and attentional difficulties (Eastwood et al., 2012; Tam, 
in press; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2017a). Either individually or jointly, these features appear to 
play a double role in the experience of boredom: they can be the antecedents of boredom, 
insofar as they precede and perhaps cause the experience of boredom, or they are the proper 
parts of the experience of boredom, insofar as any instance of the experience of boredom 
involves either one of these two features. What is more, these two features are related. If one 
appraises negatively one’s situation, then it is likely that one will not be attentive to one’s 
situation. Conversely, when a situation is incapable of capturing one’s attention, one tends to 
appraise it negatively (Eastwood et al. 2012).  
What does it mean to say that boredom involves the presence of negative appraisals 
of one’s situation? Stated in broad terms, the answer is simple: bored individuals find their 
situations to be unsatisfactory. Of course, finding one’s situation to be unsatisfactory may 
mean different things. As a result, the experience of boredom has been associated with the 
presence of a variety of negative appraisals. The most widely accepted view is that the negative 
appraisals that are either characteristic or the cause of boredom are ones that have to do 
primarily with a perceived lack of meaning. In other words, the experience of boredom is 
associated with the perception that one’s situation is lacking in meaning. Evidence for this 
view comes from studies that have demonstrated a relationship between the presence of 
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boredom and perceived meaninglessness (Chan et al., 2018; Fahlman et al., 2009; Van Tilburg 
& Igou, 2011, 2017b). 
Perceived meaninglessness is not the only negative appraisal that might be either 
present during boredom or a causal antecedent of boredom. It has been suggested that 
boredom is also related to appraisals that one’s situations is lacking in relevance (Fahlman et 
al. 2013), that the situation is low in perceived autonomy (Caldwell et al., 1999; Martin et al., 
2006; Shaw et al., 2006; Steinberger et al., 2016; van Hooft & van Hooff, 2018), and that it 
affords the individual non-optimal stimulation or challenge (either too stimulating or too 
challenging or not stimulating or challenging enough) (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; Daschmann et 
al., 2011).  
The second main feature of the cognitive profile of boredom has to do with the 
experience of attentional difficulties. It is a common theme in the boredom literature that 
boredom is a state associated with a difficulty in concentrating and maintaining attention 
(Ahmed 1990; Hamilton 1981; Hamilton et al. 1984; Damrad-Frye and Laird 1989; Eastwood 
et al. 2012; Gordon et al. 1997; Harris 2000; Wallace et al. 2003; Westgate & Wilson, 2018) 
and there have been theoretical attempts to show that attentional failure is the underlying 
mechanism of boredom (Eastwood et al. 2012; Tam et al., 2021). Support comes from findings 
that show that manipulation of attention can affect the experience of boredom (Damrad-Frye 
and Laird 1989), from studies that have linked lapses in attention to the experience of boredom 
(Carriere et al., 2008; Cheyne et al., 2006), and from the observation that tasks that require 
sustained attention, which are passive in nature, are often perceived as boring (Malkovsky et 
al. 2012; Pattyn et al. 2008; Scerbo et al. 1992). Furthermore, boredom is also experienced 
often by individuals with compromised attentional capacities (Oddy et al., 1978; Kreutzer et 
al., 2001; cf. Hunter and Eastwood 2018). 
	 8	
It is important to note that negative appraisals and attentional difficulties do not 
exhaust the cognitive features of the experience of boredom. Although they appear to be the 
most important cognitive characteristics of boredom, an altered perception of the passage of 
time has also been associated with the experience of boredom. (London & Monello, 1974; 
Watt 1991; Danckert & Allman 2005; Witowska et al., 2020). The perception of a slower 
passage of time can make oneself feel stuck in a situation and can thus intensify the aversive 
character of the experience of boredom.  
 
2.3. Volitional Profile 
Boredom is essentially a state of discontent (O’Brien, 2014). As such, it is a state that is 
incongruous with our desires and goals and one from which we seek escape (Bench & Lench 
2013). This description of boredom makes evident that boredom is not merely a cognitive or 
affective phenomenon but also a volitional one. Even the widely accepted characterization of 
boredom as “an aversive experience of wanting, but being unable, to engage in satisfying 
activity” underlines its volitional character (Eastwood et al., 2012; emphasis added). Boredom 
involves essentially a desire to do something other than what one is currently doing (Fahlman 
et al., 2013).  
The volitional content of boredom is thus characterized by the presence of a strong 
desire to alleviate one’s experience of boredom by engaging in an alternative task or situation. 
The volitional character of boredom is key in properly understanding its nature and outcomes. 
First, the presence of a desire to escape our unsatisfactory situation accounts for the distinction 
between boredom and apathy (Goldberg et al., 2011; Nisbet 1982): apathy, but not boredom, 
is characterized by motivational loss. Second, the desire to escape our situation and to alleviate 
boredom, decouples us from our current situation and prepares us for action. Such a desire 
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for escape is often successful in moving us out of our boring situation. What is especially 
noteworthy is the fact that boredom’s volitional and motivational component is so strong that 
in our attempt to escape boredom we may even find recourse in activities that are dangerous 
and harmful to us and to others (Bench and Lench, 2019; Elpidorou, 2020; Nederkoorn et al., 
2016; Pfattheicher et al. 2020; Wilson et al., 2014).  
It has been argued that what motivates one’s attempt to escape a boring situation is a 
desire to reestablish a perception of meaningfulness (Van Tilburg and Igou, 2011, 2012, 2016, 
2017b; Van Tilburg et al., 2013). Boredom, according to this view, is both a crisis of meaning 
(a state of perceived meaninglessness) and an attempt to recover lost meaning. However, 
meaning does not have to be the sole driving mechanism. It is possible that one seeks novelty, 
excitement, or a thrill without necessarily conceiving of those features as primarily meaningful 
(Bench & Lench, 2019). Alternatively, what might motivate one’s behavior in the face of 
boredom could be a desire to alleviate the aversive experience that is the outcome of mental 
representations of opportunity costs and benefits associated with the performance of a boring 
task (Kurzban et al., 2013). According to this account, boring tasks are costly (in terms of the 
psychological or computational mechanisms needed to engage with them) and less rewarding 
than other available tasks. For recent evidence in support of the relevance of the opportunity 
costs model in the case of boredom, see Boylan et al. (2021), Struk et al. (2020), and Wolff et 
al. (2020).  
 The volitional content of boredom is what we might call “thin.” That is to say, 
although bored individuals experience a strong desire to cease doing what they are currently 
doing and to engage in an alternative course of action, they do not always know what they 
wish to do (Fahlman et al. 2013). In this sense, the volitional content of boredom appears to 
be best understood as the imperative “Do something else!” without however specifying what 
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that something else is exactly. This feature of boredom can offer an explanation as to why 
boredom has been implicated in both beneficial and harmful behaviors (Bench & Lench, 2019; 
Elpidorou 2018a, 2020; Pfattheicher et al. 2020; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2017b), why bored 
individuals might be at a loss when it comes to finding ways to counter the effects of the 
experience of boredom (Bargdill, 2000; Bernstein, 1975; Greenson, 1953; Martin et al., 2006), 
and why the experience of boredom appears to involve a disrupted sense of agency (Danckert 
& Eastwood, 2020; Eastwood et al. 2012). 
 
2.4. Physiological and Expressive Profile 
Boredom is also partly characterized by its physiological and neurological correlates and by its 
motor and expressive features. Regarding the physiological correlates of boredom, available 
findings suggest that boredom is a state of low, high, or even mixed arousal. All three proposals 
have been defended in the literature (for a review, see Elpidorou 2021). Here, there is no need 
to settle the character of boredom’s physiological arousal. What matters is that boredom, 
through its physiological concomitants, can facilitate the pursuit of alternative situations, either 
by deactivating us (low arousal) and thus disengaging us from our current situation or by 
activating us (high arousal) and thus preparing us for movement, action, and change. 
 In terms of its neurological correlates, investigations utilizing electroencephalography 
(EEG) revealed that the presence of boredom is associated with reduced EEG power in 
distinct frequency bands. A study by Tabatabaie and colleagues (2014) found that boredom 
was correlated with lower beta activity in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Tabatabaie et 
al., 2014), a possible sign of attentional difficulties. A different study by Katahira and 
colleagues (2018) reported that, compared to both a flow and overload condition, boredom 
was related to lower levels of frontal theta power—a result that suggests less cognitive control 
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during boredom. An older study found boredom to be correlated with the presence of alpha 
waves (a likely indication of wakeful relaxation or mental inactivity) (Oswald, 1962; see also 
Raffaelli, Mills, & Christoff, 2018). In more recent work, Perone, Anderson and Weybright 
(2020) found that the theta/beta ratio was lower during an easy (boring) condition compared 
to an optimal condition and interpreted this finding to mean that compared to the optimal 
condition, subjects experienced difficulties maintaining their attention. Perone and colleagues 
also measured frontal alpha asymmetry, a measure of the presence of self-regulatory processes, 
and found that when the easy condition followed the optimal condition there was an increase 
in right frontal activity. Such a finding suggests the deployment of self-regulatory processes 
during the easy/boring condition (at least when the optimal condition preceded it). Lastly, 
Yakobi, Boylan, and Danckert (2021) examined the event-related potentials associated with 
the performance of a boring task. They reported reduced P3 and error-related negativity 
amplitudes in participants who experienced higher levels of task-induced boredom. Yakobi 
and colleagues interpret these findings as evidence that task-induced boredom is associated, 
on the one hand, with disruptions in working-memory updating (reduced P3 amplitudes), and, 
on the other hand, with reduced performance monitoring (reduced error-related negativity 
amplitudes) (see also Yakobi & Danckert, 2021 for EEG findings related to boredom 
proneness). 
Brain imaging shows activation of components of the default mode network during 
the experience of boredom (Danckert & Merrifield, 2016; Dal Mas & Wittmann, 2017; Ulrich 
et al., 2014). Danckert and Merrifield (2016) reported that, compared to the resting state, 
boredom was associated with anticorrelated activity in the anterior insular cortex—a result 
that may indicate that during boredom one attempts to engage with the situation at hand. The 
study by Dal Mas and Wittmann found that insular activity increased with increasing amounts 
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of money that participants were willing to pay for a music download when they were bored. 
This reported upregulation of insular activity could be indicative of a desire to engage with 
something meaningful when bored (for further discussion, see Danckert, 2019).  
 Studies examining the motor components of boredom have shown that boredom 
typically involves the act of raising one’s chin and leaning the head backwards, a collapse of 
the upper body, and lack of movement (Wallbott, 1998; see also Lhommet and Marsella, 2015). 
Bull (1987) adds that during boredom individuals often support their heads with one hand. 
Bored individuals do not move a lot. But when they do, they tend to make sudden movements 
(Kroes, 2005). Martin and colleagues’ phenomenological investigation of boredom (Martin et 
al., 2006) lists fidgeting as a response to boredom. Investigations into the facial expressions of 
boredom have not given rise to conclusive results (see Craig et al., 2008; Kroes, 2005; Scherer 
and Ellgring, 2007). Lastly, studies have found that bored speech is slow and soft, has a low 
pitch, and exhibits a narrow pitch range (Johnstone & Scherer, 2000; Scherer, 2013).  
 
3. THE FUNCTION OF BOREDOM 
3.1. A theory of boredom 
The most important claim of the functional theory is that boredom is a functional emotion 
(or affective state).3 What this claim amounts to is that boredom should be defined in terms 
of its function (Adolphs & Andler, 2018; Polger, 2012; Levin, 2018). Boredom is what it does. 
Or more precisely, boredom is the emotion that plays a specific role within our mental and 
behavioral economy such that anything that plays that role is boredom and any state that does 
not play that role cannot be boredom. This initial presentation of the functional view demands 
further elucidation. 
 First, a conception of boredom as a functional emotion is in line with a broader 
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theoretical view that conceives of most (if not all) emotions as functional (e.g., Carver & 
Scheier, 1990, 2013; Frijda, 1986; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner & Gross, 1999; Keltner & 
Haidt, 1999; Levenson, 1994; Niedenthal & Brauer, 2012; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992; Plutchik, 
2001; see also Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Tooby & Cosmides, 2008). Often proponents of this 
broader view ascribe to emotions teleological functions and not just minimal functions. Whereas 
a minimal function is simply something that an entity does (or an effect that it has), a 
teleological function is what the entity does that explains its presence (Wright, 1973). There 
are different articulations of teleological functions (Neander, 2017), but the most common 
one—at least within the context of biological sciences—is an evolutionary one that holds that 
functions are grounded in natural selection. Applied to emotions, this view of teleological 
function gives rise to the claim that emotions are the products of evolution (either as 
adaptations or exaptations): they have evolved because of their adaptive functions and 
contributions to survival (Hasselton & Ketelaar, 2006; Keltner, Haidt, and Shiota, 2006). 
Although one can speculate about boredom’s evolutionary function (perhaps it arose as a way 
of safeguarding valuable psychological resources by promoting movement out of recurring 
situations in an ancestral environment that were not conducive to the organism’s goals), the 
issue of whether boredom possesses a teleological function and what that might be will be 
bracketed here.4 One can give a functional theory of boredom without, at least initially, having 
to settle how or why its function came to be. For the present purposes, it is enough of a progress 
if we are able to state clearly what boredom does.  
 It is important to emphasize that although entailed by the theoretical position that all 
emotional states are functional states, the functional theory of boredom does not need to 
accept that all emotions are functional states. That is, one can accept that boredom is a 
functional state without also insisting that every emotion is the same. Theorists of boredom 
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do not have to commit to grand claims regarding the nature of emotions. After all, it might be 
the case that the category of emotion is not a natural kind and consequently, what holds true 
for one emotion type does not necessarily hold true for some other emotion type.   
Second, the functional theory of boredom is not a characterization of some accidental 
feature of boredom. Boredom is not something (e.g., a biological state, cognitive process, or a 
phenomenological experience) that also happens to have the function that the functional 
theory assigns to it. Rather, boredom is essentially its function. Consequently, boredom’s 
biology, its cognitive effects, the way it feels, etc., are features of boredom because they jointly 
contribute to the execution of its function. The functional theory assigns thus both an 
ontological and explanatory priority to the function of boredom.  
Third, even when it is accepted that boredom ought to be defined in terms of its 
function, it is still an open question as to whether boredom should be identified with a role or 
with the realizer of the role (Levin, 2018). The distinction is important, but unfortunately often 
missed. On the one hand, if boredom is identified with a role, then boredom is a second-order 
relational property of an organism (or system): it is the property of having some other 
properties that meet certain conditions. Specifically, boredom is the property of having a set 
of features capable of jointly executing the function assigned to boredom. On the other hand, 
if boredom is identified instead with the realizer of its role, then it is the specific neurological 
state (or process) that is actually capable of exercising boredom’s function in humans. An 
example may help to illustrate the distinction. Suppose that we simplistically define memory 
functionally as the ability to store and retrieve information. If memory is the functional role, 
then it becomes the second-order property of having some other properties (whatever those 
may be) that can store and retrieve information. However, if memory is the realizer of its 
functional role, then memory is the specific neurological process that stores and retrieves 
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information in humans.  
The distinction between these two functional understandings carries important 
ramifications. If boredom is identified with a role, then the physiological details of what 
realizes the boredom role in humans are important in helping us to determine whether 
boredom is being instantiated. Still, they are not ontologically important in the sense that they 
do not suffice (on their own) to tell us what boredom is. To see why this is the case consider 
another example. Functionally understood, a chair is a structure that affords sitting. The 
material that a chair is made out of (metal, wood, marble, inflatable plastic, etc.) does not 
determine whether something is a chair. What determines if an object is a chair is whether that 
object was designed in order to fulfil its sitting-affording function. The same goes, mutatis 
mutandis, for boredom, if boredom is identified with a functional role.  
Within emotion literature, functional views of emotions typically identify emotions 
with a role and not with the specific state that plays that role (Adolphs & Anderson, 2018, p. 
40). A reason in support of this view stems from known difficulties in finding consistent 
correlations between emotional feelings, on the one hand, and physiological patterns or 
neurological activation, on the other hand (see Adolphs & Andler, 2018; Hoemann et al., 2020; 
Lindquist et al., 2018; Siegel et al., 2018). If different instances of an emotion, say, fear, are 
correlated at different times (or in different situations) with different patterns of physiological 
or neurological activation, then fear should not be identified with a specific physiological or 
neurological state, but with something else that explains why those observed patterns of 
physiological and neurological activation are elements of fear. Identifying fear with a functional 
role can do precisely that. In the case of boredom, empirical evidence shows that boredom is 
instantiated during both deactivating and activating patterns of physiological arousal (for a 
review, see Elpidorou, 2021). Thus, it is unlikely that there is one physiological state with which 
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boredom should be identified. In addition, it has been argued that animals, and not just 
humans, experience boredom (Burn, 2017; Meagher & Mason, 2012; Wemelsfelder, 1985, 
1991, 2005). Such a contention offers further support for understanding boredom as a second-
order property. If boredom is identified with a role (and not with a specific physiological state), 
then it can occur not only in humans but also in animals and even in machines. Because of 
these reasons, the functional view presented in this essay understands boredom to be a role (a 
second-order property) and not the realizer of the role.   
 
3.2. Describing the function of boredom 
If boredom is defined in terms of its function—if it is, in other words, the second-order 
property of having properties capable of executing a specific function—then what is 
boredom’s function? Boredom serves essentially a regulatory function (Bench & Lench, 2013; 
Danckert, Mugon, et al., 2018; Elpidorou, 2014, 2018a, 2018b; Geana et al., 2016; Wolff & 
Martarelli, 2020). It signifies the presence of an unsatisfactory situation and motivates the 
emoting agent to seek escape from it. This first pass on the function of boredom does not 
fully capture the function of boredom but only approximates it. It is useful insofar as it allows 
us to grasp the general nature of boredom. At the same time, it lacks requisite specificity 
because it does not allow us to distinguish boredom from other related emotions. Consider 
for instance fear. It would seem that a functional account of fear would also assign to fear the 
two-fold function assigned to boredom. Fear, just like boredom, informs the experiencing 
agent of the presence of an unsatisfactory situation and motivates the agent to seek escape 
from it. To properly distinguish between boredom and other related emotions, one must 
specify in detail boredom’s function.   
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How then do we describe in sufficient detail the function of boredom? As a functional 
state, boredom is an interconnected cluster of characteristics (experiential, cognitive, 
volitional, physiological) that jointly give rise to either an attempted or realized transition from 
one psychological-behavioral state to another. Consequently, in our attempt to explicate the 
nature of boredom we need to offer an explanation of how this psychological and behavioral 
transition takes place. Specifically, the functional model ought to specify the following. (1) The 
input of boredom: the (typical) conditions under which boredom arises. (2) The output of 
boredom: the (typical) effects of boredom on our psychology and behaviour. (3) The input-
output transition: the manner in which the different features of boredom (its affective, 
cognitive, volitional, and physiological characteristics) contribute to the execution of its 
function. Without an analysis of how the transition works, we do not really have an account 
of boredom, but just the rudiments of a behaviorist account.  
 
Input 
There are different ways of proceeding when attempting to determine the antecedents of an 
emotion. One possible way is to try to articulate objective features of the environment that 
bear a conditional relationship to the experience of the emotion such that if an agent finds 
themselves in such-and-so conditions, then the agent would experience the emotion under 
question. In the case of boredom, studies have shown that situations that are repetitive (e.g., 
Daschmann et al., 2011; Ralph et al., 2017), uninteresting (Merrifield & Danckert, 2014), 
meaningless (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012), or non-optimally challenging (Acee et al., 2010; 
Harris, 2000; Martin et al., 2006) tend to lead to the experience of boredom. Even though 
commonplace, this objective conditional approach does not seem very promising when it 
comes to boredom. That is primarily due to two interrelated reasons. First, there does not 
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appear to be a list of environmental conditions that would either invariably or even most of 
the time give rise to the state of boredom. Granted, monotony, constraint, or repetition often 
yield boredom (Fisher, 1993), but they are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions of the 
experience of boredom (Barbalet, 1999). Second, and more importantly, whether an 
environmental factor is likely to be an antecedent of boredom or not depends on how the 
agent appraises their situation (Eastwood et al., 2012; Martin et al., 2006; Mercer-Lynn et al., 
2014; Fisher 1993). But appraisals of one’s situations need not, and, as a matter of fact, do not 
necessarily track some objective feature of one’s situation. For instance, repetitive or 
challenging situations lead to experience of boredom only in some and not in all subjects 
(Barbalet, 1999; Daniels et al., 2015; Wyatt et al., 1929). Such a conclusion regarding the 
antecedents of boredom is broadly consistent with an information-processing account of 
boredom (Klapp, 1986) which holds that boredom arises when our situation is such that 
affords the retrieval of either too much or too little information. On the one hand, 
monotonous and repetitive situations are often deemed to be boring because they are 
characterized by an informational redundancy: they offer very little new information and thus 
meaning. On the other hand, an overload of new information hinders our ability to distinguish 
signal from noise and to retrieve meaning—essentially, a situation that offers too much 
information may be judged to be meaningless and thus boring. The information-processing 
account offers a plausible explanation as to why repetition does not always have to lead to 
boredom: not all repetitive situations or stimuli are lacking in meaning. Some in fact might 
gain meaning in virtue of their repetitiveness: e.g., musical performances, religious rituals, 
mindfulness practices, or comedy routines.5 Whether a repetitive situation contains meaning 
or not depends, to a large extent, on our expectations, background beliefs, and on our ability 
to engage with and retrieve meaningful information from the situation. 
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 In light of the important role that the psychological states of the experiencing agent 
play in the experience boredom, a more promising approach of determining the antecedents 
of boredom is to look for some psychological condition that if present would give rise to 
boredom. This too will be a conditional approach, but the antecedents of the relevant 
conditionals will be, in an important sense, subjective insofar as they will involve psychological 
states (perceptions, cognitive processes, appraisals, judgments, or even feelings) that arise on 
account of the agent’s interaction with their environment (external or internal). Such an 
interactionist approach is in line with theoretical articulations of boredom that emphasize the 
importance of interpretation of one’s situation in order for the experience of boredom to arise 
(Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012; Eastwood et al., 2012). It is also in agreement with qualitative data 
that shows that experience of boredom relates to the perception of one’s situations or to the 
agent’s feelings, moods, and thought processes (Harris, 2000).  
By adopting an interactionist approach, the functional model, I hold, posits that 
boredom is a “transactional” phenomenon that arises in situations which are experienced (felt, 
appraised, or judged) by the agent to be cognitively unsatisfactory. The functional model thus 
follows a widely accepted view in boredom literature that conceives of boredom as the 
outcome of an unmet need or desire for satisfactory cognitive engagement (Eastwood et al., 
2012; Fahlman et al., 2013; Fenichel, 1953; Tam et al., 2021; Todman, 2003). Such an 
articulation of the antecedents of boredom makes evident the need for a clear description of 
the nature of satisfactory engagement. Although different functional views could spell the 
notion of satisfactory cognitive engagement differently, here I offer the following 
characterization. Satisfactory cognitive engagement with a situation requires both (a) direct 
cognitive engagement with the situation (i.e., being able to pay attention to our situation) and 
(b) the realization that the psychological/cognitive costs of sustaining direct cognitive 
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involvement with our situation are acceptable to us. In other words, our need for satisfactory 
cognitive engagement is met when we are paying attention to our situation and are willing to 
undergo the psychological/cognitive costs associated with maintaining such a direct cognitive 
relationship with our situation. Consequently, boredom will arise when we desire to cognitively 
and satisfactorily engage with an object but we cannot: either because we cannot establish a 
direct cognitive relationship with the object (due to endogenous or exogenous factors we 
cannot pay attention to the object or adequately deploy our attentional resources), or because 
we deem the psychological/cognitive costs of our direct cognitive relationship with the object 
to be too high (engagement with the object is experienced as too effortful or judged to be 
meaningless/lacking in value), or because of both.  
 It is worth noting that the two components of satisfactory cognitive engagement—
direct cognitive engagement and determination of the overall psychological/cognitive costs of 
sustaining direct cognitive engagement—can interact with each other. Certain situations, 
objects, or tasks might require from us less cognitive effort in order to cognitively engage with 
them in a direct manner. Because of that, a determination of whether the costs of our current 
direct involvement are acceptable will be influenced by the perceived effort required to sustain 
direct cognitive engagement, which in turn depends on the complexity of our current task. So, 
both perceived effort and difficulty or complexity of task turn out to be relevant factors when 
considering whether a situation will elicit boredom (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; Kurzban et al., 
2013). Additionally, our perceptions of what is boring will also be affected by the presence or 
absence of alternative options for cognitive engagement (for an ingenious experiment 
illustrating the effect of alternative options on our experience of boredom, see Struk et al., 
2020). Specifically, the introduction or elimination of alternative options will affect the 
experiencing agent’s calculus of opportunity costs. Depending on the psychological/cognitive 
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costs (and benefits) of these alternative options, the object of current direct engagement may 
appear to be boring to the subject because it may cease to be an object of satisfactory cognitive 
engagement: with the introduction of new possibilities, the opportunity costs change; indeed, 
they can change so much that the effort needed to sustain direct cognitive engagement with 
our current option has become unacceptable or too costly to us. 
Both cognitive features that were detailed in the previous section—attentional 
difficulties and negative appraisals—are relevant here. The notion of direct cognitive 
involvement can be naturally explicated in terms of attention insofar as a direct cognitive 
engagement requires the proper deployment of attentional resources. Furthermore, given that 
satisfactory cognitive engagement with an object is one that requires us to pay attention to that 
object, then boredom (which arises as a response to unsatisfactory cognitive engagement) is 
shown to be intimately related to attentional difficulties or the misallocation of attentional 
resources—a result that is supported by extant empirical evidence (Hunter and Eastwood 
2013; Westgate & Wilson, 2018) and theoretical articulations of boredom (Eastwood et al., 
2012; Tam et al. 2021; Westgate & Wilson, 2018). Tam and colleagues (2021) have argued 
“that boredom tends to be experienced when there is IAE [inadequate attentional 
engagement],” which according to them “is the discrepancy between one’s actual level (i.e., 
objectively measurable) of attentional engagement and subjectively desired level of attentional 
engagement” (p. 255). By maintaining that boredom arises when one desires but cannot 
achieve satisfactory cognitive engagement, the proposed articulation of the functional view of 
boredom is consistent with the theoretical view advanced by Tam and colleagues. Having said 
that, the functional account on offer adds to Tam et al.’s view by explicating their talk of 
“subjectively desired levels of attentional engagement” in terms of (the determination of 
relevant) opportunity costs (Kurzban et al., 2013). Attentional engagement is thus subjectively 
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desired if the psychological/cognitive costs of maintaining such engagement are deemed 
acceptable to the subject given the subject’s prior beliefs and expectations.  
 Furthermore, the proposed model accounts for the observation that negative 
appraisals are common antecedents of boredom. Negative appraisals can affect both one’s 
willingness to attend to a situation and the psychological/cognitive costs (and benefits) of 
sustaining a direct cognitive connection with the situation. On the one hand, negative 
appraisals of one’s situation will make it less likely that a subject will pay attention to one’s 
situation. Judging that a situation is meaningless, repetitive, unchallenging, e.g., would act as a 
deterrent to pay attention to the situation. On the other hand, negative appraisals will play a 
role in the determination of opportunity costs. If the object of our current cognitive 
engagement is deemed to be meaningless, repetitive, uninteresting, then the opportunity costs 
will increase. As a result, situations that are appraised negatively will tend to elicit boredom. 
  In sum, the functional account yields a necessary condition for the onset of boredom. 
Boredom requires the realization (a perception, judgment, appraisal, or feeling) that one’s 
current situation fails to fulfil one’s need for satisfactory cognitive engagement. This necessary 
condition highlights not only the cognitive aspects of the experience of boredom, but also its 
volitional character: there cannot be a state of boredom without a desire (or need) for more 
than what one is given. Lastly, the variety of the functional view that is proposed here also 
makes clear the significance of understanding boredom through an opportunity-cost 
perspective (Kurzban et al. 2013; Martarelli, Wolff, & Bieleke, 2021; Struk et al., 2020; 
Todman, in press; Wojtowicz, Chater, & Lowenstein, 2021). Indeed, whether boredom arises 
depends not just on some objective characteristic of the task with which we are engaging, but 
also on our perceptions of effort and value associated both with our present task and 




Boredom’s proposed function is the regulation of cognitive engagement. If a mismatch 
between need for satisfactory cognitive engagement and actual cognitive engagement is the 
necessary antecedent of boredom, then, according to the functional view, the intended 
outcome of boredom is the fulfilment of this need, namely, the restoration of satisfactory 
cognitive engagement. On account of the affective, cognitive, volitional, and even 
physiological concomitants of boredom, the subject will be motivated to act in ways to restore 
satisfactory cognitive engagement. In other words, the painful realization that one is no longer 
cognitively engaging with a situation in a satisfactory manner will be a drive to restore 
satisfactory cognitive engagement.  
Given the proposed notion of satisfactory cognitive engagement, there are two broad 
courses of action that could restore satisfactory cognitive engagement. First, the subject can 
seek escape from the current object of cognitive engagement and pursue a different object of 
cognitive engagement with the hope that this new object will give rise to satisfactory cognitive 
engagement. Second, one might be motivated to restore satisfactory cognitive engagement not 
by seeking out a new object of cognitive engagement but by re-evaluating one’s relationship 
to that object. For instance, subjects can re-think the cognitive costs (or benefits) of their 
current cognitive engagement (cognitive reappraisal) or attempt to make their engagement less 
effortful (e.g., by gamifying their task). Both attempts of changing one’s relationship to one’s 
object of cognitive involvement have the same aim: they alter the opportunity costs associated 
with the task in hand. Moreover, these strategies are likely to be deployed in situations in which 
the subject is unable to engage in some other form of cognitive engagement or in cases for 
	 24	
which there is a strong incentive for the subject to remain engaged with the current task (e.g., 
in school or occupational settings). 
The actual outcomes of boredom—i.e., the behaviors that a subject initiates on 
account of boredom and with the aim to restore satisfactory cognitive engagement—are 
diverse and many. Different individuals respond to boredom differently, and situations that 
elicit boredom do not all call for the same response. Boredom may give rise to a risky 
endeavour, a pro-social act, an absorbing conversation, a new challenge, a walk, an act of mind-
wandering, but also a change in one’s emotional states. There are too many outputs of 
boredom to be listed here (Elpidorou, 2020). What will resolve the perceived mismatch 
between desired and actual cognitive engagement depends not only on the agent’s beliefs, 
desires, dispositions, and, in general, on their psychological makeup, but also on situational 
factors. It is a virtue of the functional view that it can accommodate for the observed variability 
regarding the outcomes of boredom.  
Although extant descriptions of the functional account of boredom emphasize the 
successful execution of boredom’s function (e.g., Elpidorou 2014), i.e., cases in which the 
perceived mismatch between desired and actual cognitive engagement is resolved by a change 
of situation, the functional account must explain not only the successes of boredom but also 
its failures. In addition to cases in which boredom functions successfully, there will be cases 
in which boredom, just like any other emotional and psychological state, either malfunctions 
or simply fails to perform its function due to situational constraints.  
For a case in which boredom fails to perform its function consider a boring situation 
that offers the agent no escape (e.g., a long shift or a tedious meeting). Stuck in this situation, 
the agent remains in a state that is characterized by a mismatch between desired cognitive 
engagement and actual engagement. Because the situation meets the necessary condition of 
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boredom, the affective, cognitive, volitional, and even physiological concomitants of boredom 
will persist for some time—either until the situation changes and thus the subject is able to 
restore satisfactory cognitive engagement or until boredom gives way to some other 
psychological state (apathy, despair, resignation, or depression) (Bargdill, 2000). 
Boredom will malfunction when its onset fails to restore satisfactory cognitive 
engagement even though satisfactory cognitive engagement is not precluded by situational 
factors. There can be may reasons as to why this regulatory failure takes place. Here I mention 
two. First, in light of the provided characterization of satisfactory cognitive engagement, a 
chronic failure to adequately deploy attentional resources or the possession of inappropriate 
expectations regarding the value or difficulty of one’s situations could preclude the successful 
regulation of cognitive engagement. Regardless of what the subject does, they cannot find 
satisfactory cognitive engagement. Second, boredom might fail to contribute to the restoration 
of satisfactory cognitive engagement if the subject is unable to muster up the psychological 
resources necessary to initiate escape out of the situation that is the presumed cause of the 
cognitively unsatisfactory situation. Mugon, Struk, and Danckert (2018) offer preliminary 
evidence in support of this potential malfunction of boredom by reporting a negative 
correlation between locomotion (the aspect of self-regulation that involves the commitment 
of one’s psychological resources to initiate and maintain goal-directed activity; Kruglanski et 
al., 2000) and boredom proneness (a tendency to experience boredom frequently).  
Our discussion of the function and possible malfunctions of boredom makes evident 
that the intended output of boredom is a situation that is unlike the input situation. Because 
of that, boredom can be adequately characterized as a self-effacing emotion. In other words, 
boredom is the psychological-behavioral transition that aims to “rescue” us from what initiated 
the transition in the first place. This self-effacing nature is possessed not only by boredom but 
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also by other emotions and psychological states. It also coheres with evolutionary accounts of 
emotions that conceive of them as attempted solutions to recurring problems. Disgust, for 
instance, motivates withdrawal behavior from the stimulus that gives rise to disgust and in 
doing so, it leads the emoting agent in a situation that is no longer disgusting. Pain works in a 
similar manner for it can be understood as a mechanism that protects us, among other things, 
from harmful or potentially harmful stimuli (Eccleston & Crombez, 1999; Koster et al., 2004; 
Van Damme et al., 2007). 
 
Input-Output Relationship 
In addition to specifying the input and output of boredom, the functional model must also 
provide information as to how boredom executes the input-output transition that is essential 
to it. That is to say, the functional account ought to explain how the various affective, 
cognitive, volitional, and physiological changes that the input state brings about facilitates the 
psychological-behavioral transition characteristic of boredom. 
The onset of boredom gives rise to an aversive sensation. This is almost a truism in 
discussions of boredom and a claim that is widely supported by experimental evidence (for 
references, see section 2.1.). The fact that boredom is aversive is also predicted by the variety 
of functional view that is offered here. Boredom arises when cognitive engagement is no 
longer satisfactory. Unsatisfactory cognitive engagement involves attentional difficulties 
and/or high psychological/cognitive costs for sustaining direct cognitive engagement with the 
object of cognitive engagement. Both causes of unsatisfactory cognitive engagement will likely 
give rise to aversive feelings. On the one hand, the disruption of flow or cognitive errors that 
are the products of inattention or misallocation of attentional resources are associated with 
aversive feelings (see Eastwood et al, 2012). On the other hand, the effort associated with 
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sustaining direct attention when opportunity costs are high is theorized to give rise to aversive 
feelings (Kurzban et al., 2013).  
The associated aversive phenomenology of boredom will motivate one to seek escape 
both from the situation that is thought to be responsible for the feeling of boredom and from 
the feeling itself. This motivational effect of the phenomenological feeling is amplified by the 
cognitive and volitional changes brought about by the input state. Because of its very nature, 
the input state is appraised as being unsatisfactory, unengaging, or lacking in meaning. We are 
unable to sustain attention and we wish to do something else. In addition, we often mind 
wander and perceive a slower passage of the time. Such characteristics make our situation all 
the more aversive, increasing even further our desire to escape from it. The presence of mind 
wandering permits us to think of other situations that we would rather pursuing.  
Lastly, the physiological changes that are associated with the onset of boredom are 
also conducive to its function. A decrease in arousal helps one to further disengage with the 
input situation. An increase in arousal readies one for action which in the case of boredom is 
characterized by an attempt to escape the input situation. Activation of the Default Mode 
Network is suggestive of mind wandering (or at least, the turning of one’s attention “inwards”) 
(Danckert & Merrifield, 2016; Ulrich et al., 2014), and the findings from encephalographic 
recordings reported in section 2.4 show that the onset of boredom makes it harder for one to 
remain cognitively engaged with one’s situation (Katahira et al., 2018; Perone, Anderson & 
Weybright, 2020; Tabatabaie et al., 2014; Yakobi, Boylan, and Danckert, 2021).  
 What the functional account ultimately offers is more than a mere description of what 
goes on during boredom. It identifies boredom with a second-order property or a role. 
Boredom is the attempted psychological-behavioral transition from an input state (a perceived 
mismatch between desired cognitive engagement and actual cognitive engagement) to an 
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output state (the resolution of this mismatch). In other words, boredom signals the presence 
of unsatisfactory cognitive engagement and promotes the restoration of forms of cognitive 
engagements that are satisfactory. Not only is the functional definition of boredom consistent 
with available evidence regarding the character of boredom, it also shows how the different 
components of the state that we call “boredom” are components of one of the same state: 
these are all rightly considered to be components of boredom because jointly they execute 
boredom’s function.  
 
4. REFLECTIONS ON THE FUNCTIONAL MODEL 
4.1. Agreement and disagreement within the functional camp 
The foregoing presentation of the functional view of boredom describes the basic 
commitments of the functional view and explains the manner in which it can accommodate 
available findings. Ultimately, the functional account conceives of boredom as a regulatory 
state: boredom signals that our current situation is non-optimal and motivates one to engage 
in an alternative situation that is perceived as a better fit for the agent (Danckert, Mugon, et 
al., 2018; Elpidorou 2014, 2018a, 2018b; Van Tilburg & Igou 2011, 2012; Wolff & Martarelli, 
2020).  
 Beyond this initial agreement, there is room for disagreement even amongst 
proponents of the functional view. Perhaps the most important point of potential contention 
concerns the driving mechanism behind the regulatory aspect of boredom. Is it the pursuit of 
interest or at least the avoidance of meaninglessness? (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012) Is it the 
search of novelty or stimulation? (Bench & Lench, 2019) Is it an affective cost-benefit analysis 
that aims to move the subject out of a situation that is perceived to be costly (compared to 
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other alternative ones) and into one that is more beneficial or less costly (Kurzban et al., 2013)? 
Or it the restoration of satisfactory cognitive engagement, as it was presented in this essay?  
  Another point of contention among proponents of the functional view concerns the 
nature of boredom’s physiological arousal. For instance, Bench and Lench (2013) hold that 
boredom is a functional emotion because it is both a state that conveys information about the 
nature of our current activity and one that can motivate us to pursue an alternative activity 
when the intensity of our current experience fades. Bench and Lench hold that boredom is an 
emotion of high arousal and argue that such a feature of boredom contributes to its 
motivational function insofar as it prepares one for action. Other presentations of the 
functional account do not insist that boredom has a specific physiological arousal—in fact 
some deny altogether the claim that arousal is a determining characteristic of boredom 
(Elpidorou, 2021). Instead, boredom’s function can be served either when there is a decrease 
in arousal (insofar as such a change can deactivate one from the boring situation) or when 
there is an increase in arousal (insofar as such a change can prepare one for action and 
movement).  
 These are important issues that would need to be resolved through further empirical 
research. Having said that, such disagreements appear to be internal to the functional view and 
regardless of how they are settled, they do not affect the general principles of the functional 
picture 
 
4.2. Good or bad?  
Does the functional view of boredom entail that boredom is beneficial? The answer is both 
“Yes” and “No.” If the functional view is accepted, then boredom is identied with a role: 
boredom is the attempted transition from an input state (a perceived state of unsatisfactory 
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cognitive engagement) to an output state. Understood as a psychological-behavioral transition, 
it is hard to see boredom as anything but a boon. Boredom signals the presence of 
unsatisfactory (or non-optimal) situations and motivates escape from them. It is an affective 
tool that helps us to regulate our behavior, to keep us moving, and that can potentially rescue 
us from prolonged states of discontent.  
 Of course, the claim that boredom is a functional state does not entail that every 
exercise of its function is beneficial to the experiencing agent. Possible malfunctions of 
boredom were discussed in the previous section. But even when boredom does not 
malfunction, there is no guarantee that its exercise will always be beneficial. Numerous studies 
have demonstrated the potential of boredom to bring harm to the experiencing agent (Bench 
and Lench, 2019; Nederkoorn et al., 2016; Wilson et al., 2014) and to others (Danckert in 
press; Elpidorou 2020; Pfattheicher et al. 2020). Indeed, risk-taking activities are ones that 
many will find interesting and exciting and as such will provide a solace from boredom. At the 
same time, such activities are associated with potential dangers. What is more, individuals 
might find a situation boring even though they should not. Consider, for instance, the 
experience of boredom within academic contexts (Belton and Priyadharshini 2007; Mann and 
Robinson 2009; Pekrun et al., 2010 and 2014; Vogel-Walcutt et al., 2012). Assuming that the 
academic activity is important for the subject, the experience of boredom does not allow the 
subject to focus on the activity, leading potentially to an outcome that is not beneficial to the 
subject. To be clear, the fact that boredom does not always play a salutary role in our lives does 
not vitiate its importance in our lives nor does it take away its regulatory function. Many of 
our emotional states (e.g., fear, anger, pride, joy) can have both beneficial and harmful 
consequences. And so can most of our regulatory drives or states (hunger, thirst, etc.). An 
understanding of both the benefits and harms of boredom is a necessary step in the direction 
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of explicating its nature even more clearly.  
 
4.3. Benefits of the functional account 
The functional account of boredom carries a number of theoretical advantages. Here, I briefly 
discuss the following three. 
 
A. Animal research 
The functional account can inform research investigating the experience of boredom in non-
human animals (Burn, 2017; Meagher & Mason, 2012; Wemelsfelder, 1985, 1991, 2005). 
Armed with a functional definition of boredom, researchers can investigate whether non-
human animals exhibit similar psychological-behavioral transitions when placed in seemingly 
boring situations. Because of its functional nature, boredom can be studied in non-human 
animals without demanding a close neurological similarity between them and humans. Not 
only that, but the functional definition can allow researchers to differentiate between the 
experience of boredom and that of apathy in non-animals: only the latter is associated with 
motivational loss and lack of an attempt to escape one’s situation. Lastly, if non-human 
animals do in fact experience boredom, then the experience of boredom is unlikely to be 
conceptually demanding. In fact, it could be argued that perceived meaninglessness cannot be 
an essential component of animal boredom (see also Svendsen 2019). This conclusion might 
force proponents of functional accounts of boredom to steer away from views that render 
search for meaning the sole mechanism responsible for the regulatory aspect of boredom.  
 
B. Distinguishing boredom from frustration 
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The functional definition allows us to distinguish between boredom and other related 
emotions. Consider the case of frustration. Although it is customary to distinguish between 
boredom and frustration in terms of their associated levels of physiological arousal (boredom 
is a low arousal state whereas frustration is a high arousal state) such distinction appears to be 
problematic. Empirical evidence shows that boredom may involve activation in physiological 
arousal (e.g., Barmack, 1937; Braby et al., 1992; Geiwitz, 1966; Giakoumis et al., 2010; Kim et 
al., 2018; London et al., 1972; Lundberg et al., 1993; Pattyn et al., 2008). and that it is often 
subjectively experienced as an agitated state (Harris, 2000; Martin et al., 2006; Steinberger et 
al., 2016). Moreover, there have been theoretical attempts to show that boredom does not 
have a specific physiological arousal (Hill & Perkins, 1985; Elpidorou, 2021) and measures of 
state boredom have defined and operationalized boredom as a state that is both high and low 
in arousal (Fahlman et al., 2013).  
  The functional account provides a solution to this problem. What distinguishes 
boredom from frustration is not the fact that the former is a deactivating state whereas the 
latter is not, but a difference in their respective functions. Whereas boredom’s function is to 
motivate the organism to escape from a situation that yields a perceived mismatch between 
desired cognitive engagement and actual cognitive engagement, frustration motivates the 
organism to keep trying to overcome the obstacle that gives rise to frustration (Amsel, 1992; 
Grimm, 2008; Jeronimus & Laceulle, 2017; Yu, 2016). What is more, the functional account 
can contribute to the development of more accurate measures of boredom. If it turns out that 
boredom and frustration are distinguished in terms of their respective functions and not in 
terms of differences of physiological arousal, then self-report measures ought to include items 
that capture functional differences, perhaps by asking questions regarding what one would do 
in various situations, and should avoid items that focus too heavily on how arousal is 
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subjectively experienced. In turn, other measures of boredom, ones that do not rely on self-
report items (e.g., those used in affective computing), should not look for differences in 
physiological correlates in order to distinguish between boredom and frustration, but to 
differences in behavior which are more likely to be indicative of respective differences in 
function.  
Struk and colleagues (2021) have reported that the experience of boredom is associated 
with both high and low levels of perceived control, whereas frustration is associated only with 
low levels of perceived control. The proposed functional view of boredom offers a potential 
explanation for boredom’s relationship to perceived control. Both conditions (high and low 
perceived control) could be construed as indications of unsatisfactory cognitive engagement. 
High perceived control would likely suggest to the subject that there is no more new 
information that could be extracted from the situation—a result that could subsequently affect 
the subject’s willingness to attend the situation and also bring about a decrease in the perceived 
value of cognitive engagement with the situation (or even an increase in the value of pursuing 
alternative situations). Low perceived control could also hinder satisfactory cognitive 
engagement but by affecting the amount of effort required in order to pay attention to such a 
situation. If the required effort to attend is too high, then the subject would be disincentivised 
to pay attention to the situation and thus a low control condition could preclude satisfactory 
cognitive engagement. 
To be clear, the aforementioned explanation of boredom’s (quadratic) relationship to 
perceived control is, at this point, speculative and ought to be tested experimentally. What is 
important to point out is that the functional view of boredom offers a natural explanation to 
Struk and colleagues (2021)’s additional result that boredom and frustration differ in terms of 
their associations with perceived control. As mentioned above, the functional view 
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distinguishes boredom from frustration in terms of their respective functions. Whereas 
boredom aims to restore satisfactory cognitive engagement, frustration aims to assist an agent 
in their attempt to overcome the obstacle that gave rise to frustration in the first place. Such a 
functional distinction is consistent with what Struk and colleagues (2021) reported in the case 
of frustration, namely, that it was associated only with situations characterized by low 
perceived control. Given its function, frustration is not expected to arise in situations that are 
characterized by high perceived control. Such situations will not be perceived by an agent as 
obstacles to their goals and it is thus unlikely for them to elicit frustration. 
 
C. The relationship between state and trait boredom 
Boredom researchers distinguish between state boredom and trait boredom. On the one hand, 
state boredom is a transitory emotional experience. On the other hand, trait boredom is a 
personality trait, i.e., the propensity to experience boredom frequently and in a wide range of 
situations. Researchers assess the presence of trait boredom using self-report measures (i.e., 
questionnaires). Although there is a wealth of research utilizing some measure of trait boredom 
and investigating the correlates of trait boredom, there are important theoretical issues with 
the current understanding of trait boredom. The psychometric properties of commonly used 
measures of trait boredom (BPS) appear to be problematic (Melton and Schulenberg, 2009; 
Struk et al., 2017; Vodanovich, 2003). Furthermore, it is unclear what measures of trait 
boredom exactly measure: do they measure a propensity to experience boredom or one’s 
inability to adequately deal with the onset of boredom (Danckert, Hammerschmidt, et al., 
2018; Gana et al., 2019)? Both articulations are consistent with the self-report measures 
currently used in order to evaluate trait boredom. Lastly, the relationship between trait 
boredom and state boredom is unclear.  
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Although the functional model focuses exclusively on state boredom, it can be used 
as a starting point for theorizing about the relationship between state boredom and trait 
boredom. Specifically, one hypothesis consistent with the functional model is the idea that 
trait boredom is the result of a systematic malfunction of (state) boredom. As it was already 
mentioned, boredom can malfunction when the onset of boredom fails to resolve the 
perceived mismatch between desired and actual cognitive engagement. In other words, 
boredom fails to fulfill its function when it either fails to move the agent out of the input state 
or when it leads the agent into a new situation that is similar to the input state insofar as it is 
also characterized by a perceived mismatch between desired and actual cognitive engagement.  
The proposed relationship between state boredom and trait boredom yields 
empirically testable predictions for it relates the presence of trait boredom to difficulties in 
self-regulation, self-awareness, the ability to interpret one’s emotional states, and the ability to 
cognitively engage in a satisfactory manner with one’s situation. Specifically, the proposal 
predicts that an inability to initiate motion (e.g., low in the locomotion component of the self-
regulatory model) can give rise to frequent and prolonged affective, volitional, and cognitive, 
and physiological changes associated with the experience of boredom because one would 
remain stuck in the input state that brings about those changes. A lack of knowledge regarding 
what one finds cognitively engaging could also lead to a more frequent experience of boredom 
because even if one is capable of motivating oneself to pursue an alternative situation, one 
might be incapable of finding a situation that resolves the issues that gives rise to boredom in 
the first place. In turn, a difficulty to understand what one is feeling can also contribute to the 
frequent or prolonged experience of boredom because one might be incapable of appreciating 
what is giving rise to boredom and as such one might not be able to use boredom’s 
motivational force as a way to escape the input situation. Finally, factors that can hinder 
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satisfactory cognitive engagement (attentional difficulties or inappropriate expectations 
regarding the value of one’s situations) are also predicted to be relevant factors for the presence 
of frequent or chronic boredom. Contrarywise, the functional model predicts that individuals 
who are capable of moving from one situation to another, who have clear goals and desires, 
who are capable of interpreting and understanding their emotional states, who do not 
experience chronic attentional difficulties, and who have adequate expectations about the 
value of their situations will be less likely to score high on measures of trait boredom compared 
to those who lack these characteristics. In support of the proposed relationship between self-
regulation and trait boredom, Struk and colleagues (Struk et al., 2016) have shown that high 
locomotion (the component of self-regulation that is supposed to reflect one’s ability to initiate 
motion) is strongly negatively correlated with boredom proneness.  
 
4.3. Limitations 
The functional model is not without its challenges. First, it is a theoretical account of boredom 
and thus proponents of the functional account ought to make clear how it can be falsified. In 
response to this demand, proponents of the functional model could suggest that if there is a 
state called “boredom” but is completely apathetic—insofar as in such a state one experiences 
a motivational loss—then such a type of boredom will not be able to serve the proposed 
function of boredom and thus the functional view would be falsified. Stated otherwise, if we 
have reasons to count a completely deactivating state as a state of boredom, then the functional 
account would have failed to capture the essence of boredom. Moreover, if the provided 
descriptions of the input of boredom, intended outcomes of boredom, or the input-output 
transition characteristic of boredom are not accurate, then the functional view would have to 
be revised or rejected.   
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 Second, the functional view is necessarily committed to the view that boredom is a 
functional state. Because of that, it is important for proponents of the functional account to 
provide evidence in support of this basic premise by supplementing their theorical account 
with biological and evolutionary considerations that would make it plausible that boredom is 
either an adaptation or exaptation (Lench et al., 2015). 
 Last, the functional account appears to be a backward-looking model. That is, it utilizes 
available evidence on the character of boredom in order to come up with the function of 
boredom. It is thus important for proponents of this account to show how it can concretely 
advance research on boredom. Can the view generate novel predictions? Can it solve problems 
within boredom research? And in general, can it actively further our understanding of 
boredom? Although some work has been done to address these concerns, much more needs 
to be done.  
   
5. CONCLUSION 
The functional account is a promising theoretical approach to boredom. Although it is not the 
only available theory of boredom, it has discernible benefits: inter alia, it can incorporate extant 
empirical evidence; it can offer a clear articulation of boredom; and it yields testable 
predictions and opens up new avenues for research. If the functional account is accepted, then 
boredom ought to be identified with a role or second-order property: that is, boredom is the 
agentic or organismic property of having properties that are jointly capable of instantiating a 
transition from an input state (a perceived state of unsatisfactory cognitive engagement) to an 
output state (a perceived state of satisfactory cognitive engagement). Boredom, in other words, 
is most fundamentally a mechanism for cognitive change. This is, in short, the view of the 





1  The psychodynamic theory has fallen out of fashion. However, recent work on boredom has 
emphasized the importance of a volitional component in the experience of boredom and argued that 
the presence of an unfulfilled or ill-formed desire during the experience of boredom reveals a 
disruption of agency that is characteristic of the experience of boredom (Danckert & Eastwood, 2020; 
Eastwood & Gorelik, in press). 
2  Even though the MAC Model combines insights from both the existential and cognitive 
(specifically, attentional) theories of boredom, I am inclined to count it as a distinct account of 
boredom. This is for two reasons. First, it holds that attentional difficulties and perceived 
meaninglessness are individually sufficient but not necessary for the experience of boredom. This 
commitment on behalf of the MAC Model distinguishes it from attentional and existential views: those 
views insist, respectively, that attentional difficulties and perceived meaninglessness are necessary for 
the experience of boredom (for a discussion of the differences between the MAC Model and the 
attentional view, see Tam et., 2021). Second, and perhaps more importantly, the MAC Model entails 
that, depending on its causes and outcomes, there can be distinct kinds of boredom: attentional 
boredom, meaningless boredom, and mixed boredom. On the issue of whether there are distinct kinds 
of boredom, see Elpidorou (2021) and Goetz et al. (2014).  
3  Throughout the essay I consider boredom to be an emotion. Such treatment is in line with 
common practice within the psychology of boredom. Although I believe that there are good reasons 
to treat boredom as an emotion, it is not necessary to rehearse them here. The characterization of the 
functional view of boredom that I advance in this paper holds regardless of whether state boredom is 
ultimately an emotion, a mood, a cognitive attitude (Yao, in press), a feeling (Eastwood & Gorelik, in 
press), or some other kind of psychological state. Still, readers interested in arguments in support of 
the view that boredom is an emotion should consult Bortolotti & Allifi, in press; Elpidorou, 2018b, in 
press; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2017a; Yucel & Westgate in press.  
4  Danckert (2019) offers a different account of boredom’s evolutionary origins. He argues that 
boredom arose as a signal to balance the drives of exploration and exploitation. See also Gomez-
Ramirez & Costa (2017). 
5  For comedy routines, see, e.g., James Acaster’s Kettering Town FC routine or Kurt Braunohler 
and Kristen Schaal’s Kristen Schall is a Horse sketch, both of which rely on repetition in order to provoke 
laughter. Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on the information-processing 
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